Better Off,
But Still on the Farm
Harlan B. Miller
Virginia Tech

A review of Farm Animal Welfare: Social,
Bioethical, and Research Issues, by Bernard
E. Rollin (Iowa State University Press, 1995)
pp. xii + 168, ISBN 0-8138.2563-6, $29.95

So BER-MP's focus is not on welfare or suffering
(though of course preventing natural behavior causes
frustration, and pain and terror inhibit relic behavior).
Neither is it on a general notion of inherent value or of
rights to equal consideration. Animals must not be
abused, and especially must not suffer the profound
frustration of being prevented from realizing their teloi.
But there is no necessary incompatibility, BER-MP
holds, between respecting an animal's telos and raising
it for slaughter.
The second author is Bernard E. Rollin the
agribusiness tactician. I'll call him BER-AT. This
personality doesn't seem to be a philosopher at all. He
speaks the language of prudence, not that of duty. He
has no views whatever about animal welfare. He's
responsible for the 'social' in the book's subtitle.
Consumers and voters, increasingly, are concerned
about farm animal welfare as they perceive it. (Are they
right? Are they wrong? BER-AT doesn't care-it's not
his job.) DER-AT's job is to advise agribusiness about
this threat to current and future profits. Worried about
flooding? Build a levee and buy insurance. Worried
about animal welfare concerns? Change some practices
and fund some research.
I've known BER-MP slightly, and his works
extensively, for many years, and thought well of both.
BER-AT, however, is new, at least to me and at least in
the strength he has here.

1. The Authors
This book, valuable but intennittently irritating, appears
to have been written by two distinct Bernard E. Rollin
personalities. One of them is Bernard E. Rollin the
meliorist philosopher. DER-MP (as I shall henceforth
refer to him) became well known with Animal Rights
and Human Morality (fIrSt edition 1981, second edition
1992). He is a meliorist rather than an abolitionist
inasmuch as he believes that significant animal use.
especially for food, is here to stay and need not be
morally objectionable. He holds. however, that very
much existing animal use fails to meet minimal moral
standards. Ibe lot of animals in human hands must be
significantly ameliorated. Distinctive of the ethical
analysis of BER-MP is the notion of an animal's telos,
the complex of desires and behaviors or more generally
of ways of being, of acting, and of relating to one's
conspecifics, that are natural for a member of the
species. To prevent an animal from living in accordance
with its tetos is to deprive it of a minimally decem life.
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them, on rodeo, shows up later in the very paragraph
from which I have just quoted.
Real or imaginary (or, more likely, a bit of each),
traditional practices of good husbandry, telos
respecting if not always benevolent, no longer govern
agricultural practice. In some areas (cattle on range),
they have been undermined. In others (chickens, veal
calves), they have just been extirpated. Modem animal
agriculture is capital-intensive, animal-intensive, and
husbandry-poor (it is not just that there are too few
workers to attend to the needs of individual animals
but that the mindset and wage structure of intensive
agriculture actively discourage such attention).
Further, much modem animal agriculture is confine
ment agriculture, and confinement invariably frustrates
drives central to the teloi of the animals confined.
Things have changed for the animals, and changed
much for the worse.
Human society has changed as well. We have moved
from the farms into the city, losing direct contact with
agriculture. The mass media have exploited our
fascination with animals. To these two points by BER
AT, BER-MPadds that society has been progressively
opening itself to concern for hitherto neglected or
excluded groups, with nonhuman animals a natural next
step in the expansion. Pro-animal arguments by
philosophers (including, of course, DER-MP himself)
have rcached a wider and wider audience.
The result is a "new social ethic for animals." A
large majority of Americans are concerned about the
treatment of animals. A remarkable number arc willing
to ascribe rights of some sort to nonhuman animals.
But an even larger majority ofAmericans believes that
it is permissible for us to consume animals as food.
BER-AT takes this 'ethic' as his point of reference. We
will continue to raise and consume animals, but the
welfare of the animals must be improved (and most
important, must be perceived as improved), even if the
result is increased costs.
Is the "new social ethic" coherent? Can we really
believe both that animals have some son of moral claim
to concern (never mind the philosophical distinctions
between rights, welfare, and so on) and that it is
permissible raise and kill them (or even just to
inconvenience them) simply because we are accustomed
to certain fonns of fO<Xl? BER-AT, as I have already
mentioned, is simply not interested in this question. But
BER-MP is quite interested in questions of coherence,
and he raises a number of them in this book. 1 Not,

2 - The Structure of the Book

The ba~ic structure and overall aims of the book appear
to have been determined by DER-AT. The intended
audience is clearly practitioners of production animal
agriculture in all its stages, especially producer's
associations and any other entities capable of funding
research, and the supporting clements of the agribusiness
government complex (the U.S. Department of Agri
culture, state agencies, the land-grant universities, etc.).
Part 1 consists of two chapters, one describing the
threat, the "New Social Ethic for Animals," and one
describing the ways in which scientific research on
animal welfare can provide defenses against the threat.
Part 2 consists of five chapters on specific forms
of animal agriculture, welfare issues for each, and
suggestions for lines of research. There are chapters
on beef, swine, dairy, veal, and poultry. (There is no
chapter on sheep, and the poultry chapter is concerned
only with chickens.)
There is a brief final chapter of reflections on
production agriculture in general.
BER-AT sets the agenda, but the voice of BER-MP
is heard again and again, least clearly in the first and
third chapters, most clearly in the sixth (veal) and last.
3 • The "New Social Ethk"

In the good old days, BER-AT tells us, traditional
agricultural practices prevented, as a rule, the abuse of
animals in agriculture. Good husbandry was good
business and the producer's interests and those of the
animals pretty well coincided.
Society, therefore, did not need laws man
dating good husbandry for animals-that was
dictated by self-interest and reinforced by the
ancient ethic of care. If a person did not care
about self-interest, he or she was unlikely to
be persuaded by laws.... This, in tum, explains
why the traditional social consensus ethic for
the treatment of animals-the anticruelty
ethic ... could be so minimal and yet socially
adequate. (p. 7)
This romantic picture of traditional agriculture is hard
to take very seriously. It is, in fact, undermined and
sometimes just contradicted repeatedly in this very book
hy what I take to he insertions by BER-MP. One of
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however, this big one. The coherence of the "new social
ethic" is neither challenged nor defended.
The purpose of the book is to survey problems of
animal welfare in production agriculture with an eye
toward removing or reducing those in conflict with
the "new social ethic." As this is sketched out, one of
the most striking of the many conflicts between the
two authorial personalities almost leaps off the page.
In the last paragraph of p. 23, BER-MP emerges to
rebut the dismissal of critics of intensive agriculture
as uninformed.

2. The conviction that one can talk of animal welfare
in a value-free, objective, factual context. Again,
this view is held by all elements of agriculture
but is elicited most easily from scientists, who are
steeped in the belief that science is value-free.
3. Thc general principle that science and ethics are
radically separated, with science having no
connection to ethics.
4. The notion that research into animal welfare cannot
address, in any scientific way, issues pertaining
to animal consciousness or animal feeling,
including felt pain and suffering. (p. 27)

Contrary to the beliefs of some elements of
the agricultural community, however, it will
not help to "educate" the public. In fact, if the
pUblic knew more about the way in which
agricultural animal production infringes on
animal welfare, the outcry would be louder....
Plainly, if the public knew... it would be more,
not less, hostile to current agriculture. [ellipses
mark omission of three examples]

Most of Chapter 2 consists of the systematic
destruction of these four claims, in the order given. It is
vintage BER-MP. That is, it is fIrst rate.
5 - The Aff'lrmative Ad Hominem

The frrst of the chapters on types of animal agriculture
is on cattle ranching. BER (both AT and MP) is clearly
fond of, or at least favorably impressed by, many
ranchers. So much so, in fact, that he slips into a fallacy
I'm going to call the affrrmative ad hominem.
It is customary to distinguish two or three varieties
of the fallacy known as 'ad hominen' (to the person).
The most common is the abusive ad hominem, of the
form "So-and-so is a rotten person, and So-and-so
believes that P is true. Therefore P is false." These
completely worthless arguments are depressingly
common. I have on at least three occasions been assured
that animal research is uniformly morally acceptable
because the people at PETA are a bunch of degenerates.
I hereby christen as 'affirmative ad hominem'
another seriously defective form of argument. The
form is "A, B, and C are decent people. A, B, and C
participate in practice X. Therefore practice X is morally
acceptable." Very little reflection should be required
to see the fallaciousness of this argument. Most of my
ancestors were probably decent people, by the light
of their times. Most people are. Yet many, in fact
almost all, of my ancestors (yours too, gentle reader)
supported or acquiesced in systems of slavery, racial
and sexual oppression, and (pace Rollin) brutal
treatment of animals.
In this book, affrrmative ad hominem arguments are
concentrated in Chapter 3. These more-or-Iess
traditional cattle ranchers are wonderful folks. Therefore
the practice of (at least more-or-Iess-traditional) cattle

In the very next paragraph (fIrst on p. 24), BER-AT is
back in control an~ ignoring his other half like a split
brain patient, warns that
... the agricultural community should develop
it,> own legislation before uninformed legis
lation is thrust on it.

"Uninformed legislation"?
4 - Welfare Research

Research on animal welfare is central to the solutions
BER-AT om~rs agribusiness. But is it even possible to
study welfare scientifically? That is the question
addressed by the second chapter. Here BER-AT passes
the baton to BER-MP. The result is a much more
coherent and much more satisfactory chapter. Four
beliefs stand in the way of animal welfare research.
1. The view that animal welfare and animal rights
represent a clear-cut dichotomy, separated by an
unbridgeable gulf. Animal welfare is perceived as
an acceptable concern of producers; animal rights
is denied any legitimacy. This opinion is held
strongly by producers, agricultural scientists, and
veterinarians and is essentially never questioned.
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ranching must be quite all right. BER-MP knows, must
know, that this is a dreadful argument. But affection
clouds his mind. 2

In the sixth chapter, on veal, BER-AT is almost
entirely absent. Confinement veal raising is portrayed
as an abomination, rejected not only by the "new social
ethic" but by cattle ranchers, some of them moved to
tears by films of calves in crates.

6· Varieties of Animal Agriculture

7· Human Farm Animal Welfare

All of the chapters on specific forms of production
agriculture will be of great value to anyone interested
in farm animal welfare. The references are extensive
and illuminating. (Unfortunately, the notes arc at the
end of the volume rather than at the foot of the page,
where they belong. Certainly Iowa State press uses
computer typesetting. There's just no excuse for a major
press to persist in outmoded and quite inconvenient note
placement.) Unless you're exceptionally well
acquainted with all these forms of animal agriculture,
you will learn much. (Until I read this book, I'd never
heard of a gomer bull.)
The tension between BER-AT and BER-MP is
highest, as I have already indicated, in the Chapter on
cattle ranching. This chapter contains (a) valuable
descriptive information, (b) paeans of praise for the
traditional ranching ethos, and (c) incisive criticism of
that ethos as morally incoherent. The American tradition
of cattle ranching involves castration, dehorning, and
branding, none of which are necessary and all of which
cause considerable suffering. Less central to the tradition
is the gratuitous rough treatment ofcattle DER-MP calls
"eowboying." Cowboying is really a form of enter
tainment, a gratifying demonstration of macho mastery
(not limited, alas, to males). Ibe rodeo is to eowboying
what college or professional basketball is to pickup
playground basketball. BER-MP points out that many
people immersed in the ranching tradition are
uncomfortable about cowboying and, a fortiori, about
rodeo. But very few show real concern about the more
central practices of castration, branding, and dehorning. 3
The presence of BER-MP increases even further in
the next chapter, on swine. Ibe discussion of the natural
behavior (i.e. the telos) of swine is fascinating, and the
criticism of routine tail docking and other responses to
the 'vices' created by confinement and overcrowding
is impressive. (The attack on the vice of 'vice' talk is
just the sort of thing BER-MP does best.)
TIle treatments of diary farming and of poultry are
both quite impressive. I found the criticism of debeaking
exceptionally useful because of the powerful scientific
evidence BER-MP musters. In both chapters, the telus
analysis plays a major role.
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In the short and schematic conduding chapter, DER
AT is back. But in these very general reflections on the
state of American agriculture, he and BER-MP have
something important to teach us. There are human
animals down on the farm, too, and they're not doing
very well. The transformation of agriculture that put
chickens in cages and cows in crates also put farmers
in debt, or at the merey of a merciless market, or just
out of business. The family farm is effectively extinct,
replaced by the factory, the multinational corporation,
and those it has effectively reduced to sharecropper
status, or the economically marginal operation in which
every human adult has another full-time job.
Rollin sketches a dream of a future in which people
can lead a good life on the farm. Those of us to the
'left' of him on animal treatment should also have such
a vision, a vision of more people living beller on less
land, supplying the rest of us with healthy food, almost
certainly at higher cost. (There's no free lunch, and no
free breakfast or dinner, either. The costs that have been
borne by the nonhuman animals, by the environment,
and by exploited and displaced farm families, will have
to be distributed somehow.) Rollin's dream isn't mine
Ixxause in his, animals arc still being raised for food.
But it is an answer to the perfectly reasonable question,
"What happens to the farmers'!" Ibat is a question that
deserves an answer.
8 - Meliorists and Abolitionists
How should an abolitionist (one who believes it morally
obligatory to abandon the consumption ofanimals) react
to this book, or for that matter, to meliorist proposals
of any sort? Purists of a certain sort will simply
denounce them as compromises with evil. Purists of
another sort might eondemn them on the grounds that,
if the lot of farm animals really were to be substantially
ameliorated, the momentum of the movement for
complete liberation would be substantially reduced.
Abolitionists of this sort would prefer for the chickens
to remain in the cages, debeaked, perhaps even for the
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calves to remain in the crates, in order to 'radicalize'
ordinary citizens by confronting them with these
horrors. Tactically, then, sucb an abolitionist should
loudly praise this book in order to taint it in the eyes of
the agribusiness establishment.
I confess that I'm not mucb of a purist here, but I
don't know wbether that is because I think mass
transformation by radicalization is wildly unlikely in
this case, or because I'm just a weak-willed compro
miser. Adoption of the sorts of reforms championed in
this book would relieve vast animal suffering and
frustration. Very many animals would be much better
off. That is, I believe, a very good reason to hope that
BER-MP and even BER-AT get the ear of the
establishment Further, if these became the standard
positions of agribusiness, the center of gravity of the
debate would have shifted a long way in 'our' direction.
(Tactically, that might mean that we should denounce
this book as violently and luridly as possible as a
compendium of sadism, thus drawing the other side to
its defense. So suppress this review.)
Read this book.

Response:
Seeing Double
Bernard E. Rollin
Colorado State University
Since a great many people arc extremely uncomfortable
in a world containing only one Bernard Rollin, Harlan
Miller's suggestion of two Rollins is certainly
unacceptable in the better world we all hope to build.
In what follows, I will do my best to unify the disparate
Rollins that he fmds speaking in my Farm Animal Welfare.
Professor Miller is absolutely correct in bis
assumption that the primary audience for the book is
the people who are in fact responsible for contemporary
agriculture in the United States-producers, USDA, and
agricultural scientists. It was, in fact, USDA that
contracted with me for the study that resulted in this
book. Specifically, I was asked to explain to USDA in
particular, and to the powerful agricultural community
in general. why they should care about, attend to, or
spend any money to improve, farm animal welfare. After
all, these are people who tend to believe

Notes
1 See, for example, the critique of some research practices
on Kantian grounds on p. 47.

2 So much so, in fact, that he complains of "cheap shols"
at the nuble ranchers (p. 57), and fires uffhis own cheap shots
at unnamed strawpersons ("producing meat protein in
fermentation vats") (p.52).

I. that science is ethics-frcc
2. that the goal of agriculture is efficiency and
productivity
3. that if there is any sense to the notion of ethics
underlying agricultural practice, it is the moral
imperative to produce cheap and plentiful food,
and lastly, therefore
4. that animal agriculture is fine the way it is and
should be altered only to create greater efficiency
and productivity.

3 "Cowboying" is depressingly common all over the
country, not just in Rollin's West. On two occasions,
agricnltural ,cientists have expressed concern about it to me.
lt should be noted that they knew they were talking to an
abolitionist. Intellectual honesty outweighed political
prudence. There are many decent people involved in
production animal agriculture.

Among the few who have reflccted on the notion of
animal welfare, it is dogma that
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in animal use was severely at odds with the notion that
animals are worthy of moral concern, a notion that
brought most of them into veterinary medicine in the
first place! In the ensuing years, veterinary colleges have
moved to embrace, rather than eschew, many animal
welfare concerns. This is also the tack I have employed
successfully with Western ranchers, who are steeped in
the ethic of husbandry that Dr. Miller somewhat
cavalierly dismisses. The result can be seen in a
remarkable pair of editorials about my work in The
Western Livestock Journal (May 15 and May 22, 1995),
reiterating rancher commitment to respecting animals'
nature and attacking industrialized, confinement
agriculture as morally unacceptable.
But what of those who are insulated from recol
lection of their own ethics by an ideology that says
their activities are value-free? Here I borrow a notion
from Hegel, namely that at least part of a philosopher's
job is bringing to articulated awareness current
movements in social thought. If the reconstruction is
correct, people will agree with one's articulation; if not,
you will be ignored.
It is ea~y to convince even those who prima facie
deny the relevance of ethics to science (1) that in society
there exists a consensus social ethic reflecting what
society believes is right and wrong and (2) that this ethic
in fact determines our laws and social policies. Purther,
it is easy to show sub-groups of society, i.e., those in
professions such as medicine, law, veterinary medicine,
agriculture, research, etc., that even though their
professional status grants them certain privileges and
autonomy, society expects them to behave in accord
with the social ethic, i.e., to regulate themselves the
way society would tell them to behave if society
understood enough about the profession to regulate it!
Failure to so accord leads to loss of autonomy; vide the
laws regulating animal research that passed when
society realized that animal researchers were not
behaving in harmony with social expectations.
It is for this reason that, in this book, I remind
agriculturalists amI agricultural scientists that society
is growing increasingly concerned about animal
treatlIlen~ and also of what fonn that concen! is taking.
(I believe, in fact, thatit is moving towards the ethic I
outlined in my Animal Rights and Human Morality.) I
do not see why Dr. Miller does not applaud this ploy,
as it at least get~ this population that ha~ ignored animal
welfare to consider the issues in a positive way. Nor do
I understalld his derisive comment, "Worried about

5. if animal agriculture is productive, the animals
must be well-off.
And these people further put their money where their
mouth is-4)f the some 600 million dollars comprising
the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) of USDA's
budget, and of the 400 million dollars making up the
budget of the Cooperative State Research Service
(CSRS) of USDA, not one cent was spent on welfare
research at the time I undertook this project.
Throughout my 20-year career in animal ethics, most
of my work has been aimed at changing the behavior
and eventually the thinking of animal users who do not,
at least initially, reflect upon the animals they use except
as means to an end. I began working with veterinary
educators, and was able to change the horrendous
practice of teaching surgery through doing multiple
survival surgeries on animals (over 20 such surgeries
on a dog was the rule in some institutions). I (and three
colleagues in Colorado) articulaled the concept behind
the 1985 federal laws mandating the control of pain
and suffering in research animals, and 1 testified before
Congress on its behalf, carrying the support of
significant elements of the research community. I was
able to galvanize significant numbers of cattlemen to
oppose the USDA practice of hot iron face-branding
and spaying without anesthesia of Mexican eattlc
entering the U.S. under NAFfA. I was able to get the
two senior researchers at the Colorado Division of
Wildlife (hardly a group of radicals) to wrile a strong
letter for PETA opposing the Nature Conservancy's
snaring of feral pigs in Hawaii, and so on.
I did not accomplish these and other advances
merely by presenting well-articulated moral arguments,
though such arguments certainly influenced some
animal users. After all, people simply blow-off many
arguments they cannot refute, especially when a
strongly entrenched ideology tells them that their
activities are "value-free" and, aforriori, "ethics-free."
There is, in fact, as Plato pointed out, only one way
of successfully changing people's moral positions-that
is by "recollection"-showing them that what you wish
to convince them of ethically is a logical consequence
of what they already believe but have not thought
lhrough properly. (Hence, Socrales' notion of a moral
philosopher being a "midwife.") One may be able to
teach empirical material, such as the state capitals; in
ethics, one can only "remind." TIlis is exactly what I
did with velerinarians; I showed them that their behavior
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wish to do so themselves. I would like to continue to
do that job without constantly being accused, directly
or indirectly, of "selling out."
I have a great respect for Harlan Miller, for his strong
dedication to animals and for his work. And I am also
grateful to him for his careful review, which is
thoughtful, fair-minded and very sensitive to the points
I have tried to make. I hope only to convince him that,
in finding two Rollins, he may be staring too closely at
the page and thereby seeing double. If he moves a little
further away, perhaps he will again see one.

flooding? Build a levcc and buy insurance. Worried
about animal welfare concerns? Change some practices
and fund some research." Isn't changing the practices
of confinement agriculture exactly what those
concerned about animal treatment ought to be after?
And isn't research the only way to effect change in
agricultural practices that have been entrenched for 50
years and are highly successful economically? Even the
most complete but rational abolitionist should, in the
world we must deal with, applaud incremental change
that benefits the animals.
Nor do I see why Dr. Miller is so cynical about
pre-industrialized, husbandry-based agriculture. While
such agriculture was certain!y not perfect from the point
of view of the animal, at least it had to respect the animals'
needs and natures to work, something industrialized,
high-tech conrrnement agriculture does not need to do!
Peter Singer and Jim Mason, Ruth Harrison, and the
Swedish public which moved to abolish industrialized
agriculture have all made similar point~.
The bottom line is that my approach works to make
things better for animals. On the strength of my report,
USDA specifically included (and funded) animal
welfare projccts for thc first timc in its competitivc
grants program. It has also held major confcrcnccs on
"farm animal well-being." I was able to address 150
USDA leaders on the wrongncss of the face-branding,
and garner their complete agreement. They are
considering making me an "ombudsman" for animals.
By the same token, the Colorado Cattlemen opposed
the face branding of Mexican cattle, despite the fact
that the National Cattlemen's Association supported the
practice--surely a courageous and moral act. They have
further spearheaded the U.S.'s strongest bill on "downer
cattle," currently passing through the Colorado
Legislature and something I helped to catalyze.
There are many very able people who eloquently
advocate for animals and help sharpen the thinking of
those already concerned about animal treatment--Peter
Singer, Steve Sapontzis, Tom Regan, Evelyn Pluhar,
Oale Jameson, Stephen Clark, Gary Comstock, and
Harlan Miller are notable examples. There are very few
people who work directly with those who use animals
and those who initially scoff at or flatly reject both moral
criticism and talk about animal welfare or animal right~.
Someone needs to get them to recollect the moral
legitimacy of issues of animal treatment. That is my
job, and most people in the animal movement see the
need for someone operating on that front, although few
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unsympathetic, sometimes hostile. BER-AT, as I read
him, sees the new social ethic as an unfortunate reality
with which agribusiness must deal (hence tile flooding
analogy) not as a positive transfonnation.
Maybe I'm being paranoid. Maybe I'm squinting
too closely at the text. Read the book to find out. But
read the book.

Reply:
Still Squinting
Harlan B. Miller
Virginia Tech
I'm afraid this isn't a very entertaining literary
controversy. Prof. Rollin replies gently to my criticisms,
and I'm unable to find any grounds on which to
denounce him.
Our differences are two. One is deep and complex.
He's a meliorist and I'm an abolitionist. That's not the
focus of this exchange. TIle second difference, of much
less inherent importance, is whether one Rollin or two
wrote FannAnil1U11 Welfare.
Prof. Rollin usefully contrasts Socratic and Ilegelian
approaches to moral reform. The Socratic relies on
'reminding' , on drawing out the consequences of what
is already believed. The personality I called BER-MP
proceeds Socratically, arguing that much contemporary
treatment of nonhuman animals is unacceptable on
principles already accepted by everyone but a few neoCartesian philosophers. (Many other writers also
proceed in tIlis way, of course.)
The personality I called BER-AT, on tile other hand,
proceeds in tile Hegelian mode, "bringing to articulated
awareness current movements in social thought." This
mode is especially useful in freeing those protected from
the Socratic approach by the armor of ideology.
Prof. Rollin denies that BER-MP and BER-AT are
different actors. There's just one Bemard E. Rollin,
operating in bolll Socratic and Hegelian modes. I'm still
unconvinced, because in tlle passages I identify with
BER-AT it seems to me that the relevant "current
movement in social thought" is not being brought to
awareness from the inside, hut descrihed from the
outside. And that description often seems to me quite
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